The status and meaning of Trump’s Gaza ceasefire deal

On October 10, the devastating bombings and other attacks that the Israeli military has undertaken against Gaza nearly continuously for the past two years finally came a halt. (Or nearly so, see below.) The Israeli military’s massive tanks and bulldozers began to lumber their way out of some– but far from all– of the parts of Gaza they had devastated over those 24 months. Some aid trucks started to roll in. Hundreds of thousands of the Palestinians who’d been forced, under withering Israeli fire, to evacuate south from Gaza City started to trudge back north to their former– very often completely pulverized– homes.

Phases of withdrawal in Trump’s plan. Source. Click to enlarge.

U.S. Pres. Trump was the one who successfully forced the Israeli government to sign onto that ceasefire agreement. (He could, at any moment since his inauguration back in January, have used Washington’s near-complete sway over Israel’s military decisionmaking to force that same outcome… And so, at any point in the preceding 15 months, could his predecessor in the White House. How many thousands of lives and destinies would have been saved?)

On October 13, as the reciprocal captive-exchange portions of the October 10 agreement were completed, Trump organized two large, splashy public events– one in Israel, one in Egypt– at which with his now horribly familiar braggadocio he took his victory laps for the ceasefire.

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Hamas in negotiations– and on the ground

Text of Oct. 9 agreement. Click to enlarge.

The clock started ticking at Noon Palestine Time today on implementation of the 6-step ceasefire + captive-release agreement negotiated in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, by Pres. Trump and his three Muslim-state mediation partners. Those talks were held on a “proximity” basis with, presumably, the Israeli negotiators in one room, the Palestinian resistance alliance led by veteran Hamas negotiator Khalil al-Hayya in another, and various groups of mediators shuttling between them.

(That’s Khalil Al-Hayya, above.)

The negotiators in Sharm had reached agreement on their 6-step plan on Thursday, but per Step 2 therein, implementation awaited the approval of the Israeli government. That was achieved this morning.

The prescribed ceasefire and many signs of an Israeli military pullback started at Noon today (local.) By that time, thousands of Palestinians whom the Israelis had previously expelled south from Northern Gaza under fire were already streaming back toward their homes in the north.

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On ‘Condemning Hamas’

I was at an in-person event here in Washington yesterday, and I raised the matter of Hamas, noting that the title of Rami Khouri’s and my recent book Understanding Hamas And Why That Matters is still very relevant. One of the speakers was the Egyptian-American Washington Post columnist Shadi Hamid. He responded by making a few fairly smart observations– but then he loudly repeated the injunction that has been his watchword throughout the past two years: “We must condemn Hamas!”

I guess that is the price Hamid feels he must pay to have access to the pages of Jeff Bezos’s failing, but still influential, rag here in the U.S. capital. Maybe he even believes it. But why? What does it actually mean to “condemn” an entire movement– and one, moreover, with which our national government has been negotiating, with varying degrees of intensity, for more than 18 months now?

A movement, therefore, whose inner workings and worldview it would presumably be very useful for both government officials and informed citizens to understand as well as possible…

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Gaza, and the UN at 80

Above: A scene from the June 1945 signing of the U.N. Charter

For many decades now, Israel has acted as the tip of the spear for “White”, Western colonial domination of West Asia and much of North Africa. Through prodigious and focused efforts, Israel’s leaders so successfully meshed their military and technological elites with those of the United States that they achieved a large degree of control over U.S. actions in countries from Iran to Libya– including, of course, U.S. policy on the crucial Palestine Question.

The fully U.S.-backed genocide that Israel has pursued for the past two years in Gaza has echoed a lengthy string of similar actions that “White” colonial powers– including the United States–have enacted against Indigenous peoples on all continents for the past five centuries. In today’s largely post-colonial world, this genocide has thus provoked a tsunami of revulsion across (and beyond) the whole of the Global South. This has greatly reduced the appeal and “soft power” that, before October 2023, Washington was able to deploy in its conduct of world affairs. It has also thrust the 30-year-long, de-facto hegemony that Washington has exercised over the UN’s global-level decision-making into ever sharper question.

Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the international reaction to it are now seen by many as marking the beginning of the end of the lengthy domination that “White”, European-origined governments have exercised for many centuries over much of the Global South.

We should note, too, that during this genocide Israel’s leaders have harshly attacked not only the steps that various bodies of the now 80-year-old United Nations have taken to end or temper the genocide, but also the foundations of UN legitimacy itself. They have thus presented the post-1945 world system with the greatest challenge it has ever seen.


Last June saw the 80th anniversary of the signing in San Francisco of the UN Charter by the leaders of all 51 of the world’s then-recognized independent governments. (That was before the dismantling of the large, globe-girdling European empires. Today, the UN has 193 members.) This September will see the opening of the 80th annual session of the UN General Assembly (GA). At this year’s GA more questions than ever before will be raised about the dysfunctionality of the UN rule that has allowed Washington to repeatedly wield its veto in the UN Security Council to block the Council from acting to end Israel’s genocide in Gaza, or to end Israel’s many other gross violations of international law across West Asia.

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Palestinian statehood and international legitimacy

The recent announcements by the governments of France and the U.K. that they have some (limited) readiness to “recognize” a Palestinian state change nothing– either regarding the genocide in Gaza or in the diplomacy over the Palestine Question more broadly. What they do do, however, is highlight once again the debate that has long simmered within the Palestinian-rights movement over whether the goal of the Palestinian movement should be a fully democratic one-state situation (‘solution’) or a two-state situation in which Palestinian and majority-Jewish Israeli states co-exist side-by-side in the land of historic (Mandate-era) Palestine.

But maybe now is a good time to re-examine another formula that’s been on the table for nearly 80 years now: that of, effectively, the three-state situation prescribed by the Partition Plan for Palestine as defined in the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 181 of November 1947?

That 1947 Partition Plan is, after all, the only authoritative and geographically delineated plan for governance in historic Palestine that carries the imprimatur of the UN and thereby its certificate of international legitimacy. And we should all care about international legitimacy, right?

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The West’s domination of the Rest needs to end. (Part 1.)

In Gaza today, we see Israel’s cruel, violent, and always ‘West’-backed military working overtime to snuff out the existence of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, two areas that have always formed a key part of Palestinian national territory. This phenomenon is not new in the lengthy record of the actions that heavily armed, West-European-origined settler cohorts have taken against the Indigenous people of lands far from the shores of Western Europe. Indeed, it replays with disturbing accuracy the actions that violent Portuguese, Spanish, English, Dutch, and French adventurers took over the past 500 years against Indigenes in the Americas, Africa, Asia, Australasia.

But today, everyone worldwide can see this latest massacre of the Indigenes taking place in all-color video, in near-real time.

That vast, non-‘Western’ majority of humankind whose ancestors were the survivors of earlier White-Western settler rampages well understands what is going on, and stands aghast at the continuing, barbaric cruelty of the Israeli government and military– and also at the active complicity of the U.S. and many/most other Western governments. (Many citizens of those complicit Western countries are also aghast at the massacre in Gaza, though a disturbing proportion of them– of us– have been cowed, silenced, and blackmailed by the endless repetition of old tropes about the need for Westerners and others always to “support Israel.”)

It is ways past time for all of this– above all, the massacres themselves, but also the complicity and the silence– to end.

I have been actively calling, since early November 2023, for the United States to step aside from the lockhold it has exercised since 1990 (or earlier) on all dimensions of Arab-Israeli “peace-making.” By wielding this lockhold, successive U.S. presidents have not just allowed but also actively supported Israel’s continued suppression of Palestinian rights, its force-backed takings of Palestinian and Syrian territory, and its repeated wars against neighbors.

At the end of that earlier essay I noted that in 1956, an earlier U.S. president, Dwight Eisenhower, had intervened against the British, French, and Israeli governments to force them to reverse the large-scale land-grab they had just undertaken against Egypt. And Eisenhower achieved that laudable goal not through military action (though he had earlier been been a forceful and effective military commander.) Rather, he did it by using only economic pressure, flexing just a small portion of the dominance the United States enjoyed in the world economy back then, to bring those three aggressive rogue states to heel. (Tragically, their Tripartite Aggression of 1956 had harmed not only numerous Egyptian military and civilian installations but also the always vulnerable, overwhelmingly civilian population of Gaza, who also stood in Israel’s way…)

In my essay I noted that just a few days later, in mid-November 2023, the leaders of the United States and China would be meeting in San Francisco. And I asked whether that meeting might see some efforts to restore oversight over Arab-Israeli peacemaking to the United Nations, where it rightfully belongs, and to end the (sharply pro-Israel) U.S. oversight of that diplomacy.

That did not happen then, and it hasn’t happened since– despite so many of us having continued to call, with increasing urgency, for the world powers to decisively END the political protection and the active support that Washington and its minions have given to Israel’s genocide in Gaza.


Like the vast majority of other governments around the world, the People’s Republic of China has been strongly critical of that genocide since the beginning, as it had been of Israel’s many other violations of international law against Palestinians and others, for many decades prior. But Beijing has still taken zero visible or effective action, of the kind that Eisenhower took back in 1956, to rein in the US-Israeli assault on Gaza and push Israel back to its recognized international border.

In March, researcher Zhang Shen published this excellent analytical essay about China’s policy on Palestinian, in Mondoweiss. In it he wrote,

The seemingly promising bilateral [trade-focused] relationship between China and Israel from 2015 to 2020, once created some voices, both within Chinese and Israeli society, calling for a deeper strategic cooperation between the two states. Yet, what happened on 7 October 2023, and in particular the Israel bombardment of Gaza that followed, irreversibly destroyed the possibility of business as usual. 

Right after 7 October, the Israeli government demanded China condemn Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and to list Hamas as a terrorist organization, but unsurprisingly, China refused this demand. The Chinese government does not accept the Western-Israeli narrative that portrays 7 October as the start of history. Instead, China sees it as one of the many tragedies of the prolonged “Arab-Israeli conflict” inherited from British colonial rule. The PRC, as a regime that emerged out of Mao’s strategy of “people’s war,” guerrilla warfare, and anti-colonial armed struggle, remains inherently sympathetic toward other guerrilla forces of the Global South.

But still, until now, the PRC government has taken no concrete steps to end Israel’s genocide in Gaza or to challenge the “ironclad” protection and support that Washington has given to the génocidaires.

I guess there are a number of possible explanations. Maybe the CCP’s leaders do not care enough about what’s happening to Palestinians in Gaza to try to take action? Or– and this I find more likely– maybe they care very deeply but are still for a number of reasons wary of confronting Washington over an issue that, as they must understand, the powers-that-be in Washington have long judged to be of central importance to them.

Whether, when, and how, we might see some change in these judgments in Beijing (or, more accurately, in the well-guarded Zhongnanhai enclave where CCP leaders hold their most important conclaves) is what I’ll be exploring in the remaining portions of this series.

This is a matter of impact far beyond the misery-soaked ruins of Gaza. That tiny enclave is now the epicenter of the “last gasp” of the White/Western supremacist worldview that has dominated world affairs for the past four-plus centuries. What happens there matters to all of humanity.

Speech policing, LSE style

The above photo shows, l. to r., Dr. Michael Mason, Dr. Catherine Charrett, me, and Dr. Jeroen Gunning just before our LSE event March 10

In mid-March, I visited the U.K. for the London Book Fair and decided to add a few days to my visit to catch up with colleagues, friends, and family there. On learning of my visit, my esteemed colleague Dr. Jeroen Gunning of Kings College London and the London School of Economics suggested he could invite me to an event at LSE where we could present and discuss the book that we– along with others– had worked together on, Understanding Hamas And Why That Matters.

I eagerly accepted his invitation. LSE’s Middle East Center agreed to host the event on March 10, and billed it as a “book launch” for our book. Palestinian scholar Mouin Rabbani, who had also contributed to the book, agreed to take part remotely from his home in Canada and University of Westminster scholar Dr. Catherine Charrett agreed to serve as our discussant. We were set to go, and on February 24 LSE/MEC opened public registration for the event.

All hell broke loose. Local pro-Israeli organizations and even the Board of Deputies of British Jews, mounted a strong protest and called on the LSE leadership to cancel it. LSE stuck to its (figurative) guns, and did so even after, on March 7 or 8, Israel’s ambassador took the The Daily Telegraph to call openly for the event to be canceled.

It is to the credit of the LSE leadership that they refused to bow to that grossly unwarranted external pressure. But the form and content of the speech policing they imposed on me and my fellow presenters as their condition for continuing to host the event was truly Orwellian. Here’s my recollection of how it went.

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Setbacks for the Axis of Resistance and for progress to a multi-polar world

The above photo is from a meeting Pres. Putin had with PM Netanyahu in 2018, when they fine-tuned some arrangements for coordination (“deconfliction”) in Syria

On December 13, I made a first stab at analyzing some of the regional and global repercussions of the recent rapid disintegration of the Asad government in Syria– and indeed, also, of the Syrian state’s entire defensive capability, which Israel bombed to smithereens in the days (and hours) right after the collapse of Pres. Asad’s government on December 8.

Over the past week I have learned more, and I hope come to understand more, about the decision-making in Moscow that was a vital factor in Asad’s collapse– and also, about the possible effects of this collapse on the regional dynamics within West Asia, and on the worldwide balance of power in an era of rapid geopolitical change. In this essay I will sketch out some of my current thinking/understanding on these matters so crucial to the fate of humankind.

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After the Trump win: The fierce urgency of Palestine in U.S. political life

These past days of hearing Trumpworld roll out the President-elect’s expected nominations for positions in the foreign policy/defense space have been harrowing indeed. As human-rights expert Craig Mokhiber remarked about the choice of far-right bully Elise Stefanik to be ambassador to the UN:

Other countries send diplomats to serve as UN Ambassadors. The US always sends AIPAC-approved Israel shills. And, this time, one who is also an abrasive, bigoted, far-right clown…

The expected nominations of uber-Zionist Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel, latter-day “crusade” supporter Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, and so on have been equally disturbing. (One possible bright spot was the report of “First Buddy” Elon Musk having met with Iran’s ambassador to the UN, back on Monday.)

Trump is an unstable, idiosyncratic decision-maker. Although most of his prospective nominations are extremely concerning, we still have zero idea of how he will actually wield his power once he returns to the White House January 20. During his first term in office he fairly frequently over-ruled his own cabinet members, or axed them at short notice. It’s also good to recall the number of times he has railed against foreign wars and the costs of overseas bases, etc.

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Washington’s Israeli Rottweiler: Is it on or off the leash?

In the 40-plus years I’ve been studying the US-Israeli relationship up close, my views of its dynamics have changed (as have the dynamics themselves.) However, one view of the relationship that has lasting validity and some inherent elasticity of its own is to view Israel as a sometimes out-of-control attack dog that over the past few decades has been built and sustained overwhelmingly through the support of– and as a perceived longterm investment for– the U.S. military-industrial-governance complex.

But has the Rottweiler now slipped the leash and started to turn on its master?

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